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Abstract
In the last decade, the UK Government has attempted to implement improved processes and procedures in modelling and 
analysis in response to the Laidlaw report of 2012 and the Macpherson review of 2013. The Laidlaw report was commissioned 
after failings during the Intercity West Coast Rail (ICWC) Franchise procurement exercise by the Department for Transport 
(DfT) that led to a legal challenge of the analytical models used within the exercise. The Macpherson review looked into the 
quality assurance of Government analytical models in the context of the experience with the Intercity West Coast franchise 
competition. This paper examines what progress has been made in the 8 years since the Laidlaw report in model building and 
best practise in government and proposes several recommendations for ways forward. This paper also discusses the Lords 
Science and Technology Committees of June 2020 that analysed the failings in the modelling of COVID. Despite going on 
to influence policy, many of the same issues raised within the Laidlaw and Macpherson Reports were also present in the 
Lords Science and Technology Committee enquiry. We examine the technical and organisational challenges to progress in 
this area and make recommendations for a way forward.
Keywords Modelling · Society · AI · Policy · Organisational culture · Organisational behaviour · COVID · Evidence based · 
Government
1 Introduction
In the last year, due to COVID, evidence-based modelling 
has been at the centre of government and decision-making. 
Although evidence-based modelling has been highlighted 
in the UK Government for decades, the circumstances and 
urgency of COVID have brought its importance to the fore. 
The policy of the UK Government is to use evidence from 
experts, through rigorous process, to underpin its decisions 
[1] on national policy. The UK Government takes evidence 
from modellers, experts and policy officials to decide on the 
best way forward. In 2012 the West Coast Mainline franchise 
disaster highlighted the serious consequences of not under-
taking robust modelling or robust decision making. The legal 
challenges to the West Coast Franchise Decision caused a 
significant loss of taxpayers’ money and serious reputational 
damage to the UK Government [1]. The Laidlaw Report 
aimed to make recommendations on how to solve the failings 
moving forward. However, the Lords Science and Technol-
ogy Committee of 2020 [2] again showed the same systemic 
issues showing up in Government Modelling. Indeed, in 
addition to those issues previously highlighted in [3], further 
issues were shown to have occurred. The problems indi-
cated by this succession of reports point to challenges, both 
technically and organisationally, that prevent robust model-
ling from being undertaken by the UK Government. In 2020 
Committee Members who sat on the inquiry boards for the 
West Coast Mainline franchise failure occupied senior posi-
tions in Government.
The Intercity West Coast Rail Franchise (ICWC) failed 
because the Department for Transport “did not get basic 
processes right and had failed to learn from mistakes made 
in previous projects” [4]. The House of Commons Com-
mittee for Public Accounts stated that this failing had not 
only occurred previously but that the recommendations 
made from the 2010 report The failure of Metronet1 [5] “to 
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prevent a lack of oversight and information were clearly 
not applied in this competition” [4]. The decision to drive 
cost savings during the Intercity West Coast Rail Franchise 
Competition and not employ external financial advisers cost 
taxpayers tens of millions of pounds, a substantial amount 
of this being used in compensation payments to bidders. 
The department were not able to quantify or understand the 
risk levels surrounding the bids and were therefore unable 
to correctly model the risk capital required to balance this. 
These errors led to the “Department asking First Group for 
a lower subordinated loan facility than was needed to protect 
itself from the recognised additional risk in the bid. A higher 
subordinated loan facility was requested from Virgin Trains. 
This opened the Department to the risk of legal challenge 
and ultimately led to the cancellation of the franchise com-
petition” [4]. These failings were highlighted by the House 
of Commons Committee for Public Accounts and attributed 
to multiple issues such as lack of leadership, lack of ability 
to challenge, lack of transparency in modelling, a drive to 
cut costs, failure to apply common sense, failure to apply 
basic processes and lack accountability [4]. This failure 
would then be examined further by the Laidlaw Report and 
Macpherson Review.
The Laidlaw Report [6] addressed what went wrong in 
the Intercity Intercity West Coast Rail Franchise failure and 
produced recommendations for moving forward. On the 3rd 
of October 2012, the competition to run passenger trains on 
the West Coast Main Line had been cancelled “following the 
discovery of significant technical flaws in the way the Inter-
city West Coast Franchise process was conducted” [6]. The 
Laidlaw Report discusses the significant flaws in the model-
ling process used and lessons learned by the Department for 
Transport (DfT) from the InterCity West Coast competition.
The aim of the Macpherson Review was to identify any 
systemic issues cross-government and to identify best prac-
tice that could be implemented moving forwards. In particu-
lar, the aim was to “examine the quality assurance of Gov-
ernment analytical models which are used to inform policy” 
[1], as well as identifying best practice from industry and 
the private sector.
This paper examines the initiatives proposed by the Laidlaw 
Report and Macpherson Review and compares them to the 
findings of the Lords Science and Technology Committee [2] 
that took place in June 2020 in the context of discussing the 
models that informed policies related to COVID. This paper 
examines the need for empirically informed studies that are 
not only robust but based on technical and organisational best 
practice. Studies that are challenged, based on good method-
ology and a thorough understanding of aspects such as risk, 
impact, caveats and assumptions. Studies that are conducted 
in the best interests of the UK population. The need for evi-
dence-based policy is discussed at length in UK Government 
publications such as the AQuA book2 [7] and in enquiries such 
as The Intercity West Coast franchise [6], the failure of the 
Metronet [5] and the Lords Enquiry of 2020 [2]. However, 
systemic failings have been highlighted for many decades with 
substantial impact on, not only the public purse but the lives 
of UK Citizens. This paper makes recommendations from the 
examination of multiple enquiries over multiple decades with 
the vision of a new future in evidence-based policy.
COVID, by 2020, was perceived as a potential public 
health issue and as such, modelling would need to be per-
formed with existing international data to determine what 
steps might need to be taken by the UK [8]. In June 2020 an 
enquiry was commissioned into this modelling after numer-
ous failings had been identified. These failings led to policy 
being implemented that was neither based on evidence-based 
modelling nor, in some cases, implemented prior to Govern-
ment and Academic modellers being able to produce their 
modelling results. The Government changed policy designed 
to influence public behaviour prior to any modelling taking 
place and at a fast pace according to evidence within the Lords 
Enquiry [2]. Modellers raised numerous concerns around the 
modelling undertaken for COVID policy such as: lack of abil-
ity to challenge the modelling or parameters, lack of appropri-
ate modelling for the situation, incorrect metrics, lack of vali-
dation and verification of models, lack of availability of data, 
incorrectly discounted modelling, lack of discussion around 
suggestions for parameters within models, lack of risk under-
standing or awareness, lack of leadership, and problematic 
resource allocation. Many of these failings had been found 
previously in the Macpherson Review, Laidlaw Report and 
the 2010 report The failure of Metronet [5] but in the Lords 
Enquiry of 2020 additional failings were also highlighted.
The recommendations found in this paper relate directly 
to the previous recommendations by the House of Com-
mons Public Accounts Committee, Laidlaw Report and 
Macpherson Review. It is recommended that leadership 
must be accountable, communicative and fully trained 
for the post. This includes understanding the processes 
in the domain of modelling and area-specific challenges. 
Transparency and data in modelling should be addressed 
by providing caveats, risks and assumptions as well as 
model-relevant paperwork. Constructive challenge should 
be encouraged and facilitated. Guidance must be based 
on existing modelling best practice but where this is lack-
ing in role and communication guidance, Prince II3 or 
2 The AQuA book provides guidance on producing quality analysis 
for Government. Please find further information in Sect. 2.3.
3 PRINCE II is a structured project management method and practi-
tioner certification programme. PRINCE II emphasises dividing pro-
jects into manageable and controllable stages.
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SCRUM4 techniques could be incorporated. Training and 
support must be provided for practitioners in modelling 
and robust data collection and use. Modelling, with the 
responsibility placed upon it to support evidence-based 
policy decision making, should be allocated as a skilled 
profession. In addition, gaps should be identified in pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary education in areas such as 
modelling the real world in an ethical and robust manner. 
This is likely to identify other aspects of note in education 
such as risk awareness, proportionality and measurement.
This paper is structured as in the following. The first sec-
tion gives an overview of the terminology and life-cycle of 
models and their quality assurance. The second section dis-
cusses modelling in the context of the Macpherson Review 
and Laidlaw Report in the wake of the Intercity West Coast 
Franchise debacle. The third section discusses how effec-
tive the implementation of the recommendations from the 
Laidlaw Report and Macpherson Review were. The fourth 
Section covers the Lords Enquiry of 2020 in which the mod-
elling undertaken to address policy requirements on COVID 
was examined. This paper then proceeds to examine organi-
sational culture as a current barrier, but also as a fundamen-
tal factor to improvement in this area and discusses what can 
be done to ensure progress. Recommendations are then made 
on ways forward before concluding.
2  Modelling
As stated in the Macpherson Review, “Modelling is essen-
tial to the work of government” [1]. “From providing the 
evidence to support major investment decisions to predict-
ing the spread of pandemic flu, models underpin decisions 
which affect people’s lives and have major financial impli-
cations” [9]. It is therefore vital that the models used are 
fit for purpose. “Balancing the tension between supporting 
innovation, so that society’s right to benefit from science is 
protected and limiting the potential harms associated with 
poorly designed modelling is challenging” [10].
In this paper a model is defined by the data journey, along 
with the outputs from this process [11]. This is because 
the inputs, outputs and data journey are one of the most 
important parts of the modelling journey. Models under the 
remit of the quality assurance process outlined in the AQuA 
book [7] are discussed. Indeed, as the analysis progresses 
through the analytical cycle, there are various checks per-
formed to ensure that the analysis is fit for purpose. Checks 
that confirm that the right analysis has been performed are 
known as validation and checks that the analysis has been 
carried out correctly are known as verification. An example 
of one of these checks is “the quality of any data inputs, and 
any assumptions that drive the analysis, including the esti-
mation of parameters” [7], indicating that the data has to be 
of sufficient quality for the model to be robust.
UK policy can be based on models as varied as, financial 
models, defence operational models or scheduling models. 
The process of building a model comprises how the data is 
collected and processed, how the model is built to achieve 
the aim of the questions being asked, the robustness and 
transparency of the model, as well as outputs and interoper-
ability. Methods to ensure fully robust models include ‘Vali-
dation’ and ‘Verification’ [7, 12] as well as such articles as 
data flow charts, model topology, version control, testing 
records and audit records.
Before outlining the life cycle of a model, we briefly dis-
cuss business-critical models in the following subsection 
given their importance and the need to manage high risks5 
associated with such models.
2.1  Business‑critical model definition
A business-critical model is defined as a model that, if built 
or altered or used incorrectly could lead to “serious finan-
cial, legal or reputational damage” [13]. These models must, 
according to AQuA and Laidlaw, under all circumstances, be 
quality assured under the AQuA book and audit processes 
within Government [6]. These models are required to be 
transparent due to potential impacts being so wide ranging 
and sizeable.
Business-critical models as defined by the Macpherson 
Review can ultimately cost lives. These models, as stated 
in the Laidlaw Report [6] and the Macpherson Review [1], 
should be subject to the highest level of scrutiny to ensure 
they are robust and transparent. The requirements around 
this were highlighted by the Macpherson Review and are 
discussed in the subsequent section on Quality assurance 
(QA).
2.2  The life cycle of a model
The life cycle of a model explains how a model is built 
and what is inherent in the process. “Typically, models 
progress through a four-step cycle, albeit often with sig-
nificant cycling between steps during the life of a model: 
4 Scrum is a framework utilizing an agile mindset for developing, 
delivering, and sustaining complex products, with an initial empha-
sis on software development, although it has been used in other fields 
including research, sales, marketing and advanced technologies.
5 High Risk is defined as likely to result in failure, harm, or injury. In 
the case of the UK Government this would also include reputational 
and financial damage.
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scope, specify and design; build and populate; test; deliver 
and use” [13]:
1. In the scoping phase the client relates what conceptual 
task they would like to solve. This might be, for exam-
ple, what aspect of a call centre needs to be optimised 
to increase revenue.
2. In the design phase the modeller takes the client’s speci-
fications that have been discussed in full with the client.
3. The build phase is where the model is constructed.
4. Testing is normally done on an existing, potentially his-
torical, data set and then validated by comparison to real 
life output.
This process follows the verification and validation 
process illustrated in the Macpherson Review [1] and the 
AQuA book []. The deliver and use phases involve creat-
ing the required documentation such as user guides, testing 
reports, version control, commented code, training materials 
and audit trails, and delivering this to the client. Something 
to note is that the client and modelling team are not always 
independent, especially in Government modelling. When the 
model builder and client are in house and potentially on the 
same team, the lines required for robust quality assurance 
can become blurred.
2.3  Quality assurance of models
To combat the aforementioned catalogue of issues raised 
in the Laidlaw Report and the Macpherson Review, the UK 
Government commissioned the AQuA book. This book was 
part of a series called the Rainbow Books and was written 
to guide analysts in the process of developing and using 
models. Subsequent to the Macpherson Review, an audit 
process was also implemented to ensure that models have 
the correct paperwork and training in place, and that custo-
dians of models would have the correct information to use 
and implement the model they are charged with overseeing.
There are many types of quality assurance that can be 
used within modelling. The Macpherson Review [1] high-
lighted that “It is important that the design stage includes a 
clear understanding of the model structure and logic as well 
as the underlying assumptions, limitations, inputs required, 
and outputs expected”. Also, “The completed model should 
be available, together with a full set of quality controlled 
input data and details of the model’s inputs’ limitations or 
uncertainties” [1].
Several types of quality assurance were proposed by 
Macpherson [1]:
• Developer testing: use of a range of developer tools 
including parallel build and analytical review or sense 
check;
• Internal peer-review: obtaining a critical evaluation 
from a third party independent of the development of 
the model, but from within the same organisation;
• External peer-review: formal or informal engagement of 
a third party to conduct critical evaluation, from outside 
the organisation in which the model is being developed;
• Use of version control: use of a unique identifier for dif-
ferent versions of a model;
• Internal model audit: formal audit of a model within 
the organisation, perhaps involving use of internal audit 
functions;
• Quality assurance guidelines and checklists: model 
development refers to department’s guidance or other 
documented quality assurance processes (e.g. third party 
publications);
• External model audit: formal engagement of external 
professionals to conduct a critical evaluation of the 
model, perhaps involving audit professionals;
• Governance: at least one of planning, design and/or sign-
off of models for use is referred to a more senior person. 
There is a clear line of accountability for the model;
• Transparency: the model is placed in the wider domain 
for scrutiny, and/or results are published; and
• Periodic review: the model is reviewed at intervals to 
ensure it remains fit for the intended purpose, if used on 
an ongoing basis.
According to Macpherson [1] the formal deliverables 
will vary depending on the model; however, there should 
be clear documentation for the model to ensure robustness 
and transparency. The recommendation was that documenta-
tion included in quality assurance processes needed not be 
cumbersome and, in some instances, more akin to a diary of 
design. The following were presented as best practice [1]:
• At the design stage, model design documentation to 
support the build phase describes the model and should 
include the quality assurance strategy for the build and 
testing phases. Some quality assurance may be performed 
at this stage to provide assurance that the model struc-
ture, logic and assumptions are robust before the model 
is built;
• Review by either internal or external reviewers should 
be considered for complex models and an assessment of 
the suitability and availability of the inputs and outputs 
should be made;
• At the build stage the documentation accurately describes 
the model as developed (noting any differences from the 
design), any verification testing done and the test results;
• Once the model is complete and has been subject to 
appropriate verification testing, a further validation 
testing phase should be conducted, and documented, to 
ensure the model is fit for purpose;
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• At the test or ‘deliver’ stage the documentation includes: 
a description of the tests run; the test results; any issues 
identified; and corrections made. If user documentation 
is needed it should also be developed and reviewed at this 
stage together with any required training material.
In the following section, the findings of the Laidlaw 
Report and the Macpherson Review are discussed in detail 
and the areas of critical importance for the improvement of 
modelling practices are summarised from the two sources.
3  The Laidlaw Report and the Macpherson 
Review
Given the number of models underpinning critical Govern-
ment decisions in 2012 it could be expected that a system 
of quality assurance already existed. However, a system of 
cross-government best practice was not in place at this point, 
and it was more siloed and department-led if it existed [1]. 
This is shown by different departments having different lev-
els and volume of model guidance, but no uniform approach 
across Government. This approach currently continues [9].
The Macpherson Review also aimed to identify busi-
ness-critical models across Government. These are the 
models with most potential to cause serious consequences 
whether legally, financially or reputationally. The Ministry 
of Defence declared around 60 such models [13], which 
constituted 13% of the overall models across Government 
at that time.
The Macpherson Review involved specialists from many 
different areas: “the review was multi-disciplinary, involv-
ing Operational Analysts/Researchers, Economics, Statistics, 
Policy Professionals, Software Experts and Social Science 
expertise as befits the very wide-ranging and diverse model-
ling stock that is used to underpin evidence-based decision 
making across Government” [13]. There is a wide variety 
in the types of models used in Government, from simple 
spreadsheet type quantitative models to very complex mod-
els using mathematical and statistical representations of the 
real world. There are also many new platforms to choose to 
model on, such as Python, R, Simul8, and a plethora of data 
science open source packages. Therefore, it is important that 
whatever package or platform is chosen, the relevant quality 
aspects required for a robust model can still be produced.
The Macpherson Review determined that “success-
ful modelling is, therefore, not just a matter of modellers 
accurately building models. Decision makers also need 
to understand the strengths and limitations of the chosen 
modelling approach. Departments’ cultures should reflect 
this by minimising barriers between policy and analyti-
cal professions, and encouraging mutual understanding 
and respect, as well as emphasising the importance of 
communication skills” [1]. The report highlighted the 
importance that a model be explained to the non-profes-
sionals, as they are key members and stakeholders in any 
model build. Not only is their context key to producing a 
robust model, but their feedback gives valuable informa-
tion towards the understanding of the model. It is crucial 
that a model "design be informed by real world needs" 
[14].
3.1  Key findings of the Macpherson Review 
and Laidlaw Report
The Macpherson Review and Laidlaw Report were very 
thorough in their investigations and understanding of the 
issues. Many of the people involved in the Intercity West 
Coast Rail Franchise were interviewed and much data and 
correspondence was sifted through. What follows are the key 
points from both sets of investigation.
The Macpherson Review stated that “it is vital that all 
levels in an organisation understand the value attached to 
models and quality assurance” [1]; this includes everyone 
from the modeller to Ministerial level. In the Intercity West 
Coast Rail Franchise, “the Permanent Secretary was delib-
erately not allowed to see the details of the competition and 
commercially confidential information” [4]. Following the 
poor escalation of issues, a poor culture of best practice, 
a lack of opportunity to challenge and an absent Senior 
Responsible Owner (SRO) [6], meant that the analysis was 
not well understood or robust [6]. Any caveats or assump-
tions that are also attached to a model should be detailed 
out in accompanying paperwork so anyone can be aware of 
the space in which the model operates and what it can and 
cannot do. The Macpherson Review stated that these should 
be “clearly communicated, and if modelling is not possible 
within the given constraints, analysts should have the sup-
port and means to say so” [1].
The Macpherson Review outlines the importance of the 
Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and that they should be 
“sufficiently senior” to take responsibility for the model: 
“the key requirement is that policy professionals and ana-
lysts work together closely to ensure the model SRO is able 
to ask the right questions, fully understands the uses and 
limitations of the model and is therefore able to sign-off to 
confirm it is fit for purpose” [1]. These were found to be con-
tributory factors in the Intercity West Coast Rail Franchise 
competition. The SRO’s sign-off assures that [1]:
• The quality assurance process used is compliant and 
appropriate;
• Model risks, limitations and major assumptions are 
understood by the users of the model; and
• The use of the model output is appropriate.
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The AQuA book also raises the requirement for education 
and training to ensure that users and developers of models, 
as well as SRO’s are correctly trained to ensure the model, 
risks, assumptions and context are well understood [7].
However, the Macpherson Review states the following: “a 
fairly high proportion of models (around 50%) had outputs 
that were available to external scrutiny and so are classified 
as ‘transparent”’ [1]. This is potentially misleading, as out-
puts alone do not contain the details required to indicate that 
a model is transparent. As detailed above, a full set of docu-
mentation, including inputs, outputs, assumptions, caveats, 
etc., would be required. Only then, with SRO sign-off, a 
full set of plain English documentation [7], and peer-review, 
should a model that is classified as business critical or that 
could have serious consequences when used, be signed off. 
Indeed, the Macpherson Review states that “If the model 
SRO cannot give their sign-off, this signals the model is 
not fit-for-purpose. In this case, the model should not be 
used until any specific issues are rectified. This may entail 
amending the model, undertaking further quality assurance, 
or producing a completely new model that better supports 
the policy need” [1].
Another common challenge within Government is that 
“there are challenges in preserving good quality assurance 
when a model’s scope and purpose shifts in response to often 
sudden change in policy and priorities” [1] and “machinery 
of government change can lead to legacy issues with mod-
els that started in one department and subsequently end up 
owned by another. It can be challenging to track the develop-
ment of these models and update them” [1]. This can cause 
serious issues both through lack of knowledge preservation, 
staffing constraints and mothballing of models (i.e. retiring 
the model and then bringing it back in to use some time 
later) [7].
The AQuA book states that “the commissioner must be 
confident in the quality of the outputs and understand the 
strengths, limitations and contexts of the analysis so that the 
results are correctly interpreted” [7]
An empirical study, [15] found that explanations and 
the way they are delivered can substantially impact the end 
result of the interpreter of the model [16]. This would be 
a highly relevant point when speaking with Ministers who 
may not have a background or an in-depth understanding of 
the model at hand.
Among the many issues identified within the Laidlaw 
Report and the Macpherson Review a number of issues stand 
out as being of critical importance in modelling practices. 
These are discussed in the following subsections.
3.2  Resources and allocation of time
The Laidlaw Report recommends that “appropriate disci-
pline is applied in the allocation and balance of time” [6, 
17], while the Macpherson Review outlined that “Depart-
ments with the most developed quality assurance processes 
appeared to have sufficient specialist and experienced staff, 
but not all felt they had the staff with the right skills in 
place to match the demands on them. Retaining special-
ist staff and providing career progression for experts was 
highlighted as a challenge" [1].
3.3  The ability to escalate issues, to challenge 
and poor communication within modelling 
and project teams
The Laidlaw Report recommends that “a review is carried 
out of escalation policy and of the effectiveness of com-
munication to staff of expectations and responsibilities in 
respect of line reporting” [6]. In the working culture of 
the project team, it was found that “one significant factor 
contributing to the flaws relates to the conduct of indi-
vidual Department for Transport officials, including in 
relation to the opportunities that were missed to escalate 
or report information” [6]. This highlights a cultural issue 
within the team that prevented escalation of problems and 
allowed opportunities to be missed [18, 19].
3.4  Skills
Another recommendation of the Laidlaw Report is that "a 
skills review is carried out and a thorough needs assess-
ment undertaken to establish whether there are capability, 
experience or leadership gaps” [6]. Education and training 
should be provided to close any gaps found. The Macpher-
son Review highlighted that “There should be appropriate 
capacity and capability where specialist staff have suffi-
cient time built-in for quality assurance, and are able to 
draw on expertise and experience across Government and 
beyond” [1]. This is supported by research by Harrison 
[20].
3.5  Leadership
In the Laidlaw Report, changes in the leadership of the DfT 
“contributed to the flaws in the ICWC franchise process and 
adversely impacted the DfT’s effectiveness in identifying 
and/or resolving those flaws” [6]. The Macpherson Review 
recommended that “There should be visible leadership at the 
top of the organisation—backed by incentives—to create a 
culture that expects high-quality QA” [1]. Leaders have to 
be people-centric for success according to Peters [18], and 
Appelbaum discusses how leaders can implement a vision to 
allow external auditing to become a reality [21, 22].
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3.6  Internal and external audit processes
The Laidlaw Report highlights shortcomings in performing 
internal/external reviews/audits: “The Inquiry team ques-
tions the basis and extent of review, checking and model 
auditing undertaken by the DfT. The Inquiry team notes that 
several internal reviews of the GDP6 Resilience Model were 
reportedly undertaken but there is no documentary evidence 
on the facts and nature of the review. There is also no record 
of any model audit or best practice review being undertaken” 
[6]. In the Macpherson Review, the internal and external 
model audit are mentioned as important types of quality 
assurance [1].
3.7  Lack of clarity around roles
The Laidlaw Report highlighted that there was a “lack 
of clarity in roles and responsibilities and in associated 
accountability, including a failure to get the SRO structure 
to work for the benefit of the project” [6]. This indicates that 
the SRO may not have been adequately qualified or may not 
have had time to be involved in the project, which would 
be a very large oversight considering that the expert on the 
model was not present in many project meetings [6]. The 
report also stressed the following: “It should be noted that 
the SRO role is an important one not only in ensuring that 
the required resources are available but also in providing 
overall oversight, quality control and risk review as well as, 
where appropriate, escalation to Ministers” [6]. In addition 
to this, there was a perceived lack of efficacy in the govern-
ance framework, and lack of clarity around the function, 
authority and interrelationship of committees and boards 
was also cited as a contributing factor. There appeared to be 
a link to non-independency of boards and committees, which 
caused some escalatory and quality issues [6].
3.8  Senior Responsible Owner (SRO)
The approach of allocating a Senior Responsible Officer to 
models was highlighted as a preferred way forward in the 
Macpherson Review. The responsibilities of the SRO and the 
importance of this role were outlined earlier in this section; 
they included: (a) the seniority of the SRO for the purposes 
of responsibility and accountability; and (b) the conditions 
required for an SRO sign-off for a model. Furthermore, in 
relation to the design stage, “The model SRO should at this 
stage check that the proposed design meets the organisa-
tion’s requirements. They should check the assumptions, 
limitations, inputs and outputs to make sure they remain 
consistent with the intended use of the model and discuss 
the most appropriate approach to QA” [1].
3.9  Summary
In this section it can be seen that the majority of the issues 
concern organisational culture, learning and processes. 
“Knowledge loss causes challenges for organisations that 
wish to remain competitive. These organisations must iden-
tify the risks that could lead to knowledge loss and become 
aware of issues that affect knowledge retention” [23–25]. 
Indeed, it has been a common concept for decades that a 
business should “review their successes and failures, assess 
them systematically, and record the lessons in a form that 
employees find open and accessible”. Thus, “the knowledge 
gained from failures [is] often instrumental in achieving sub-
sequent successes” [26]. This has been seen within IBM’s 
computer development programmes, Boeing’s progress from 
the 707 and 727 to its success with the 737 and747 models 
and also within Xerox’s product development process [27].
Garvin [26] also gives a recipe for successful knowledge 
transfer in the following quote “For learning to be more 
than a local affair, knowledge must spread quickly and effi-
ciently throughout the organization. Ideas carry maximum 
impact when they are shared broadly rather than held in a 
few hands”. Garvin [26] indicates that training programmes, 
personnel rotation and education can be some of the most 
effective ways, along with reports, to “ensure that knowledge 
is transferred across the organisation” [26].
However, this process is crucially interrupted when 
downsizing is brought into the equation, as happened dur-
ing the last decade within the civil service. Fisher states that 
“even when downsizing is implemented without the inten-
tion of major re-structuring, the net result is the same num-
ber of employees left to do the same amount of work” [28]. 
This indicates that a compounding of factors, including lack 
of adequate organisational knowledge transfer and learning, 
could potentially have led to the same issues that were found 
in the ICWC enquiry being found again in the Lords Select 
Committee of 2020 nearly a decade later [2].
After the ICWC disaster, it was the AQuA book that 
was written to try to alleviate the issues found in the initial 
Laidlaw Report in 2012. In the next section, we examine 
what the AQuA book set out to do and whether these goals 
were achieved [29].
4  The AQuA book
As noted by Robinson and Glover [9], multiple publications 
were created in order to address the myriad of issues within 
Government modelling post ICWC; these are known as the 
Rainbow books and include:6 Gross Domestic Product.
 AI and Ethics
1 3
• The Green book, which look at the processes of appraisal 
and evaluation in Central Government;
• The Orange book focused on the management of risk, 
and covered principles and concepts;
• The AQuA book provided guidance on producing quality 
analysis for Government;
• The Magenta book covered Central Government guid-
ance on evaluation.
The AQuA book [7] is the most relevant for the discus-
sion here; this book is a compilation of key texts intended to 
guide modellers and interpreters, and also to give an outline 
of quality assurance processes. This book covers the follow-
ing aspects of modelling [7]:
• Analysis, modelling and decision making in Government;
• Roles and responsibilities in analysis and model develop-
ment;
• Risks in modelling and analysis;
• Quality assurance, verification and validation;
• Overview of common pitfalls.
The AQuA book follows much the same direction as the 
other Rainbow books but emphasises the implementation 
of analysis and modelling. More granular directions and 
guidance are given. The AQuA book provides advice for 
producing fit for purpose analysis and provides guidance 
on verification and validation of models. The AQuA book 
also provides guidance and useful templates to produce the 
relevant documentation to prepare for quality assurance.
The three pillars concentrated on within the AQuA book 
are uncertainty, stakeholders and fitness for purpose. This 
covers: (a) advice for working in the scoping phase and com-
municating with stakeholders involved in the model; (b) 
uncertainty and how to deal with assumptions or caveats 
which may produce a large amount of uncertainty in a model 
and (c) fitness for purpose, how the model works and how it 
can be verified and validated [30]. These three pillars aim to 
ensure modelling follows a process that would ensure a fit-
for-purpose, robust and transparent result that can be audited 
and delivered with some degree of confidence.
Post AQuA book there was sporadic activity across Gov-
ernment in producing modelling guidance. The National 
Audit Office, in 2016, produced a short paper on a Frame-
work for Modelling [31] and in 2018 the Department for 
Energy and Climate Change published a paper on Model-
ling Assurance [9]. The AQuA book does reasonably well 
in formalising the technical aspects of modelling but does 
not address the critical areas of leadership and resource 
allocation. This was one of the key outcomes of the ICWC 
enquiry. In itself, process design and implementation is an 
extremely valuable task but without the relevant soft skills 
and the support of leadership, in a manner that encourages 
cultural change, it is of little use. This is because organisa-
tional behaviours are inextricably linked to the acceptance 
and use of processes. If employees do not understand or 
do not buy into the leader’s vision, or have issues with the 
process, then no matter how good the process appears it 
will fail. Wu notes that process and organisational conflict 
result in negative outcomes for projects [32]. Wu also states 
that “process conflict and relationship conflict affected each 
other and were negatively related to project success, leading 
to poor communication among teams” [32]. This brings us 
to the year 2020 and the Lords Select Committee Enquiry 
which concentrates on modelling nearly a decade from the 
ICWC enquiry [2].
The Lords Select Committee for Science and Technol-
ogy was called to question modellers on the robustness of 
their analysis that has been used to underpin Government 
policy in relation to COVID. Some of the members of this 
committee were also present on the Lords Committee on AI 
implementation in the UK in 2018 which examined explain-
ability, transparency and modelling [33].
In the Lords Select Committee of June 2020, many of the 
issues highlighted by Macpherson and Laidlaw came again 
to the fore. Issues such as lack of time, lack of ability to chal-
lenge and lack of understanding of uncertainty were quoted 
as reasons why the modelling produced was not robust, did 
not follow guidance and was at some points, even discarded 
by stakeholders unnecessarily. Quality assurance processes 
quoted ranged from none to checking a press conference 
number against a model that may or may not have been veri-
fied and validated.
To enable comparison, the output from the Lords Select 
Committee is examined under the same headings as the 
Macpherson Review and Laidlaw Report, in addition to new 
emerging issues. As the output of the Lords Committee was 
in the form of oral transcript, it has been reported in this 
paper in this manner. In the transcript, A is the Interviewer 
and B the Interviewee.
4.1  Resources and allocation of time
It is stated that the team were not allowed the time to model 
despite this being one of the key outputs of the Laidlaw 
Report and the Macpherson Review. “All that we ask for 
as modellers is that, as these things are implemented, we 
have the time to get some data, even if it is just preliminary 
data” [2].
The interviewee commented on the short turnaround time 
between a request for modelling and the delivery deadline; 
they mentioned that the typical time is 2–3 days and that 
often this is over weekends. They further mentioned that 
this short turnaround does not allow the modellers to address 
anything other than what has been posed; additionally, they 
said: “There is not a whole lot of room for interpretation and 
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for addressing questions other than that which has been put 
down from on high and from SAGE” [2].
SAGE (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies) had 
driven the modelling despite there being qualified experts 
present to undertake this. Challenge appears not to have been 
possible here and the phrase ‘on high’ puts the conversation 
on a certain footing. This is similar to issues found in the 
Macpherson Review indicating that culture of challenge and 
communication continues to be an issue.
4.2  The ability to escalate issues, to challenge 
and poor communication within modelling 
and project teams
The following quotes demonstrate a lack of challenge and 
open communication channels with leadership. There is also 
a key issue with what models were asked to do versus what 
they were actually capable of doing.
B: “This modelling committee … has been used to 
address a very narrow set of questions, which largely 
have been to do with population-wide social distanc-
ing: lockdown. It has not been used to explore other 
possible ways to respond to this epidemic. That is 
absolutely not the fault of the modellers; they are doing 
what they are asked to do” [2].
B: “We can make fairly simple, statistics-based fore-
casts for 2 weeks—I think you said that, [My Col-
league], and I would agree. Longer term, there are 
too many uncertainties. I do not think we can make 
predictions” [2].
The interviewer asked to what extent the modellers have 
been able to change their approach, including parameters 
and input data to take into account uncertainty. Following 
on what the interviewee said about the use of the data being 
focused on social distancing, the interviewer asks what else 
it should have been focused on besides social distancing.
Having not used data from across Europe, the model was 
targeted at the wrong interventions despite the modellers 
having months of previous data from international sources:
B: “So far there has not been so much interest in tar-
geted responses—except in very particular circum-
stances, which I am sure we will come back to—and 
the models have not been asked to, and have not really 
considered, those targeted responses in detail. Shield-
ing, for example, a very appropriate strategy for peo-
ple who are particularly vulnerable to this virus, has 
been part of Government policy across the UK Nations 
practically since day one, since the very early stages, 
but it is not included in any of the models. We are not 
aiming the models at the right target; we are aiming 
them at everyone when in fact the burden of this dis-
ease is very concentrated” [2].
B: “Typically, we react to commissions that come from 
SAGE, which presumably come in turn from the Cabi-
net Office, and they tend to be targeted at population-
level impacts”.
A: “In a sense, then, not all the right questions have 
been asked. Has there been any move among the mod-
elling community to seek to persuade policymakers 
that there should be a greater focus on some of the 
sub-population?
B: "London saw if not a more rapid growth then a 
greater level of infection prior to lockdown, and corre-
spondingly has had a much more rapid decline since so 
there is a question to be asked whether London could 
have a differential relaxation of measures to elsewhere 
in the country. The question of age is still not one that 
I think has been widely discussed" [2].
Here there is clear disagreement on modelling aims and 
not enough consideration of previous data, data that could 
be used to validate or verify the ensuing model. There is 
inconsistency apparent that SAGE wanted population level 
modelling when the data was showing that targeted interven-
tions would have performed better. Therefore, Lord Hollick 
states that the right questions were not asked. Challenge does 
not seem to be an open channel to the modellers and they are 
asked to “persuade” policy makers when this critical exer-
cise should be an open discussion. There was also a reported 
inconsistency in the ‘R measure’ meaning it was difficult to 
explain when the measure itself was not well understood [34, 
35]. The understanding of risk, risk proportionality and sub-
sequent communication to the public was not robust [2, 36]. 
Again, there is a lack of ability to challenge on this, despite 
the feeling that an alternative approach to risk would have 
been better. This is illustrated in the transcript where the 
Interviewer states that the R measure appears inappropriate. 
The Interviewee responds that the single measurement has 
been a distraction and that to use a single measure to drive 
policy would be misleading. The Interviewee further states 
that the general impression is that the R measure is a critical 
number but that this would be incorrect. By concentrating on 
the R number the Interviewee states that we have now lost 
sight of the real risk of the over 70’s and the lack of model-
ling around this cohort.
B: "(…) we should probably go back to old-fashioned 
public health and think about it in terms of risk: what 
is the risk to an individual in this location at that 
time? Apart from anything else, that is very helpful 
to the individual concerned, allowing them to make 
informed choices about how they behave. I am not sure 
whether the R number helps an individual decide how 
to behave, but it certainly does not help me" [2].
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Here the modeller states that what they have been asked 
to model is not appropriate. Therefore, by extension it may 
not be useful to base policy on. There are additional issues 
with risk perception and management here that are crucial to 
understanding the level of appropriate risk for an individual. 
This is detailed out in the paper by Oldfield & McMonies 
submitted to the Lords Risk Planning Committee in 2021 
[36].
4.3  Skills
The responses given below indicate that potentially the mod-
els used were simply not well enough understood by policy 
makers. The model being discussed simply gave potential 
futures, not a specific future. It appears to be a very vague 
model along the lines of multi-simulation type modelling. 
This was a pertinent point raised by Macpherson where 
policy makers were unable to challenge models as they did 
not have the understanding to do so.
The Interviewer asks about the predictions done by the 
models and whether they do indeed come true. The Inter-
viewee states that the models simply simulate many hun-
dreds of thousands of scenarios but without a likelihood 
attached to them. It is stated that the model just produces a 
long list of alternatives for what might happen [2].
4.4  Leadership
In the following exchange, it can be seen that the questions 
are potentially not the right set to be asking of the data and 
modelling team. However, again challenge does not appear 
to be possible.
A: “First, are you content that, from whichever source 
these questions are coming, the correct questions are 
being asked of the models and the data you have avail-
able, that the limitations are properly understood by 
those asking the questions, and that you and fellow 
modellers are in a position to dismiss those questions if 
the methodology for the modelling you have available 
to you is inappropriate to address them?” [2].
The answers to these questions were deflective. One 
answer was there was not as much oversight over models 
as there could have been and another answer stated that the 
wrong questions were being asked of the modellers in the 
first place. Challenge or discussion was not mentioned as a 
recourse to potential poor decision making. Another answer 
stated that there were no examples of validity checks on 
the models being used and that one team did not necessar-
ily know what the other team were working on. The lack 
of interdisciplinary working along with distant stakehold-
ers means that context and discussion, which are critical 
to developing and using models, is lost. This problem is 
covered extensively in the AQuA book [7] and Laidlaw 
Report [6] where potential communication channels, team 
formation and relevant mandated paperwork are discussed.
4.5  Internal and external audit processes
No mention was made of quality assurance or validation 
and verification processes which are documented at length 
in Government publications and are mandated for business-
critical models. The type of validation and verification dis-
cussed does not constitute any reasonable attempt at valida-
tion and verification and indeed is not along any lines that 
are prescribed or mandated in Government guidelines for 
modellers.
B: “I think the first batch was reported by Patrick Val-
lance at one of the press conferences. He reported a 
particular figure, so I immediately asked my team, 
“What’s our model saying about last week’s level of 
antibody positives?” They said, “It predicts about 6%”, 
which was exactly what Patrick Vallance said. So we 
felt reassured that our model had successfully captured 
something that it had not had any data inputs for. That 
sort of internal validation happens continuously with 
all these models” [2].
This is in stark opposition to documented and mandated 
best practice by Laidlaw [6], which is concerning. Modellers 
should be able to understand their model and output and use 
validated quality assurance techniques to understand their 
model. This was laid out very clearly in the Laidlaw Report 
[6] and the Macpherson Review [1]. When asked how often 
the models that policy is dependent upon are tested, the 
response was that verification and validation of the sorts of 
models that are used in real time have always been extremely 
challenging” [2].
This point raises a potential culture issue as Norling 
[37] states that often academic modelling is done in the 
abstract with no danger of significant decisions being made 
as a result, so the risks are minimal; the picture of assur-
ance through development is in sharp contrast to much of 
the actual practice in academic modelling where a lot of 
the ‘assurance’ is done post-hoc after the analysis and just 
before publication.
In the Macpherson Review [1] it was stated that there 
was good practice to be found across Government. However, 
cross-government communication and the spread of best 
practice may not have been achieved as we saw previously 
with local attempts at guidance implementation that were 
mostly ineffective or failed altogether. There is also evidence 
from DSTL [7] and the Ministry of Defence that operational 
models that have to be used in real time can be validated 
and verified, especially in the operational analysis toolkit 
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for field guidance. This best practice could, as a minimum, 
have been used to ensure that models were correctly assured.
4.6  Senior Responsible Owner (SRO)
There did not appear to be any SRO mentioned, despite the 
emphasis in the Macpherson Review [1] on having an SRO 
for each model developed with the purpose to inform policy. 
This could be a potential culture issue due to academic mod-
elling not being joined up with Government modellers.
4.7  Policy becoming divorced from the modelling
In the enquiry it was raised by the modellers that policy to 
change the public’s behaviour was taking place before the 
modelling could be undertaken. The modeller then has to try 
to keep up with changes in policy and has no hope of mod-
elling impacts given a changing environment. This raises 
large red flags as to what evidence these policy changes were 
made upon. Here, it seems that the Government is changing 
parameters and policy so quickly that modellers are not able 
to convene the necessary interdisciplinary experts. Conse-
quently, policy decisions were made on, what was thought 
to be, incorrect questions and parameters being modelled.
4.8  Modelling being incorrectly discounted
In the following exchange, it is detailed that work has been 
undertaken around many aspects of COVID and related 
possible interventions but that this work was not fed into 
policy-making. Another issue here was that challenge was 
not possible to discuss the parameters of the model. As the 
parameters were of key importance but not added into the 
models, they were discounted.
B: "With regard to age, [and social distancing] there 
is an enormous amount of modelling activity going on 
around the world. (…) We have done lot of work on 
this in my own group and there is work out there, but 
this is not what has been fed down into SPI-M 5 by 
SAGE and the Cabinet Office” [2].
The modelling had been undertaken in order to answer 
the full scope of the problem, but SAGE and the Cabinet 
Office did not take this information on. Furthermore, it 
seems that challenge was not possible on the scope or type 
of questions to be asked or considered and interdisciplinary 
work and discussion fell by the wayside.
Having identified an at-risk group, it was not then mod-
elled according to the Interviewee who states that the flu 
models were originally constructed to model schools. How-
ever, there is very little going on in schools and due to there 
never having been an outbreak in schools worldwide that 
we know of it is not critical to model this. The Interviewee 
states, however, that Care Homes should have been modelled 
but were not, despite the risks being raised.
4.9  Lack of best practice and interdisciplinary 
working
The Interviewee states that other relevant models were not 
studied or examined by modellers on this team. Indeed, 
despite Spain and Italy having serious concerns within care 
homes, the care homes were not modelled. The Interviewee 
had not studied these models in detail and so could not say 
if there was any important information that should have been 
used in UK modelling [2].
4.10  Lack of availability of relevant data 
within the UK
The lack of cross-government communication seen here con-
cerning open data sources is very disappointing. This data 
could potentially be critical for modelling but could not be 
obtained in a reasonable or timely manner.
B: “The data management systems we have in place 
through the NHS and NHS Scotland, which I am more 
familiar with, are frankly very cumbersome. It has 
been difficult to extract the right data at the right time 
for the right person in the right place. There is a lot 
of difficulty there. That is a historical problem; I have 
been complaining about it for about 10 years" [2].
4.11  Summary
This section not only illustrates the perpetuation of the 
issues found in the Laidlaw Report [6] and the Macpherson 
Review [1] but highlights new areas of concern within the 
availability of UK data, lack of best practice and interdis-
ciplinary working, modelling being incorrectly discounted 
and modelling becoming divorced from policy. Some of 
these issues can be connected to leadership issues and the 
lack of communication and ability to challenge, i.e. the areas 
that AQuA guidance did not cover in a substantial way post 
the Laidlaw recommendations. Here it can be seen that, not 
only have the organisational knowledge transfer and cultural 
issues identified by Macpherson persisted, but further issues 
are highlighted where the processes prescribed and man-
dated within the AQuA book [7] and by Laidlaw [6] have 
not been implemented. The processes detailed in the AQuA 
book were designed and implemented to establish a route to 
transparency for modelling and a verified pathway to ensure 
models are constructed correctly and the validated and veri-
fied so that policy decisions have a sound basis.
In the Lords Select Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy, 2020, it can be seen that previous steps that have been 
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taken have not had the intended effect. These may not have 
had an effect because the organisational issues were not 
embedded in the AQuA book or other documentation. Fur-
thermore, this is compounded by issues of lack of relevant 
data, modelling being incorrectly discounted and policy 
diverging from the evidence-based modelling approach man-
dated by the UK Government for policy decision making. 
Addressing organisational issues seems to be key to progress 
in this area. One might argue that COVID modelling has an 
urgency that is not necessarily there for all modelling, how-
ever, in many departments, especially defence, modelling 
can be even more urgent than COVID. The urgency makes 
the requirement for robust modelling even more manifest. 
The next section outlines a number of recommendations 
with the aim to institute robust modelling across Govern-
ment for both urgent and non-urgent circumstances. It is 
not the urgency here that drives the requirement for robust 
modelling but the method by which models should be kept 
up to date and in working order.
5  Recommendations and conclusion
Post the Laidlaw Report [6] and the Macpherson Review [1] 
much work was put into constructing a series of documen-
tation to improve analytical modelling across Government. 
Throughout this paper, it can be seen that similar issues 
with analytical modelling remain and new problems both 
with technical processes and cultural problems have been 
raised by the Lords Select Committee [2]. As seen in the 
first section, Macpherson raised multiple issues with the 
ICWC franchise and Laidlaw went on to propose multiple 
ways forward both technically and culturally to ensure that 
the same mistakes were avoided in the future. As shown in 
the analysis of the Lords Enquiry of 2020, we not only see 
the same issues re-occurring but new issues coming to the 
fore. This could be partially due to AQuA failing to address 
the organisational and cultural issues. It could also be due 
to a lack of implementation of the AQuA book by multi-
ple departments within the UK Government. It is clear that 
the processes laid out by Laidlaw and AQuA have not been 
successfully implemented form the testimony in the Lords 
Enquiry 2020.
Based on the findings we propose a unified modelling 
framework that takes the foundations provided by the AQuA 
book and addresses further the issues found within cultural 
and organisational contexts.
As the Macpherson Review states, adequate education 
and training should be provided to both leadership and tech-
nical staff to ensure fit for purpose analysis. We propose 
that this education should begin at university level where 
ethics, modelling and knowledge transfer are introduced 
within courses to establish a culture of knowledge transfer 
and learning as well as technical best practice. Modelling is 
undertaken in technical sciences at university but the Bench-
mark Statements7 include this as part of a larger degree and 
so there can be a lack of focus on the teaching of modelling 
or ethics as a specific skill. The skills required to use a basic 
statistical model would not be sufficient to start from scratch 
and build a model reflecting real-world scenarios with which 
to inform policy. This is a skill in itself and includes such 
aspects as awareness of data quality, ethics, user implemen-
tation problems, context and an understanding of the envi-
ronment that the model is being created in, for example, 
defence or public sector, where there can be a high price to 
pay for faulty analysis.
We also propose that, despite downsizing or austerity 
measures, even small organisations, with the right culture 
can embed best practice. Boeing, Xerox and IBM have 
shown that huge strides can be made once the organisa-
tion culture is developed to enable them. Therefore, despite 
downsizing having occurred within the civil service, pro-
cesses are able to be adapted to ensure the continuation of 
robust analysis [28].
The recommendations from this paper are as follows:
• Clear, accountable, communicative and fully trained 
leadership: Leadership must be involved as no less than 
a cultural shift is needed to implement this. Leadership 
bears the responsibility of ensuring communication and 
challenge are facilitated as well as ensuring guidance is 
followed in terms of robust modelling. Leadership train-
ing in this area is crucial [38]. As highlighted by the 
analysis of the Laidlaw Report, the Macpherson Review 
and the Lords Select Committee from June 2020, lead-
ership and management have been key to ensuring that 
communication and challenge are necessary for robust 
modelling to occur. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure 
that adequate training is given [1] in this area to those in 
management positions in departments where modelling 
occurs. This training should be developed beyond generic 
aspects related to leadership and management to include 
aspects related to modelling, understanding the whole 
process of modelling and the leadership and management 
implication at each stage in this process.
• Transparency in both modelling, data and communica-
tion: Transparency is a key element of the data collection 
[8, 16] and modelling process. When modelling is under-
taken, the risks, caveats and assumptions must be explicit 
in the accompanying paperwork. The limitations must 
also be explicit. This means that the model and data can 
be used for the purpose it is currently validated and veri-
7 Benchmark Statements are the detail of a taught degree and justify 
content as well as assessment.
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fied for. Any changes may then be tracked such that the 
model can be adapted for different circumstances until a 
limit of change is reached that triggers another valida-
tion and verification cycle [39]. Transparency then drives 
challenge due to the explicitly clear function and devel-
opment of the model. Scrutiny can then be performed 
more efficiently either inside or outside the domain of 
the model.
• Facilitate constructive challenge: Foster an environ-
ment of constructive challenge, especially around Policy. 
This area should not be the domain of a few committee 
members to feed down narrow questions; the modellers 
should have the ability to use the data and model what 
they believe, in their expert opinion, to be a valid way 
forward [3, 13]. It must be a two way conversation. As 
we have seen in the Lords Enquiry, modellers have some-
times been denied the opportunity of challenge within 
their work which has led to experts producing modelling 
that they are ready to admit is not robust. Unfortunately, 
modelling can have a huge impact on UK Society (such 
as the resulting policy seen in 2020) and as such it is not 
appropriate to bypass expert opinion without sufficient 
communication. If a policy expert is unaware of the mod-
elling being undertaken then the context and assump-
tions might not be passed on. Therefore, if a modeller is 
asked to model something specific and cannot challenge 
this then there may be large errors where context, reality 
and assumptions are not captured. The modelling asked 
for may not be appropriate. Therefore it is crucial that 
modelling experts be able to have open communication 
with those for whom they will be modelling. To create an 
open challenge environment leadership is key. Wu [32] 
outlines that a communication methodology is key and 
states that it is crucial in developing the team for success. 
Without open communication the team cannot learn from 
conflict or implement processes robustly [32]. Where 
Government departments do use JSP6558 for evidence-
based modelling requirements, project and programme 
execution for investment approvals it does not specify 
communication channels, working roles, methods of risk 
discussion or routes for raising challenges. This could be 
ameliorated by taking best practice from such method-
ologies as SCRUM and Prince II that are very clear on 
aspects such as roles and communication channels.
• Guidance must be based on existing modelling best prac-
tice: There is a wealth of knowledge such as the AQuA 
book that can be built on very easily. This type of docu-
mentation can be used internally or industry wide as it 
is somewhat model agnostic. The conceptual modelling 
journey overarches how to build models not the specifics 
of building them. This in turn is subject to leadership, 
availability of those with the right set of skills who are 
able to model well and the existing quality assurance 
procedures being used and developed further [1]. The 
right professionals must be recruited to construct and use 
models as modelling requires a huge amount of training, 
that is becoming more of a burdern as machine learning 
and AI is being introduced [40–44]. This means that pro-
fessionals involved in modelling are becoming even more 
specialised on tools and data. This should be reflected in 
recruitment.
• Provide support and training on robust modelling pro-
cess for practitioners: Focus on supporting practitioners 
in collecting and analysing high-quality data sets with 
a focus on how the data is collected and the statistical 
robustness of the initial data. As detailed in Macpherson 
and AQuA, professionals must be supported with ongo-
ing training and developments so that they can continue 
to be effective in their role and continue to build robust 
modelling. Training also should also extend to policy 
makers and management within departments that pro-
duce modelling so that aspects such as the risks, assump-
tions and context of the model are well understood [1, 8, 
36].
• Provide support and guidance on robust data collection 
and use: Understanding what data is present and how 
it relates to the real world. Understanding the purpose 
of the required modelling in collaboration with domain 
experts. Data quality and accessibility is key for model 
developers. If a modeller is not able to access the cor-
rect data then the model cannot be robust. Collecting 
new data might also be necessary and this should be 
done robustly to ensure the right data is collected for 
the model. Indeed, this guidance already exists in part, 
published by the UK Government Statistical Service [45] 
and the European Statistical Service [46].
• Recognise modelling as a skilled profession: Allocate 
modelling as a skilled profession with relevant recogni-
tion; alongside domain-specific educational resources, 
courses and tools [47–49]. If we wish to recognise 
experts in modelling and recruit them correctly for our 
needs, we must have an understanding of who is quali-
fied. There are numerous professional charterships one 
can rely on to judge the experience of a professional but 
they do not indicate the particular areas of technology 
of modelling that the professional is qualified in. As we 
move towards an ever more complex environment of 
tools and methodologies it is crucial to undertstand the 
skills we need for a project and where to find them [50].
• Address gaps at primary, secondary and tertiary educa-
tional levels: Implement training in this area from school 
8 Joint service publication (JSP) 655: Investment Approvals, which 
is the policy and guidance on modelling and evidence required for 
investment approvals and scrutiny.
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level so that the complex concepts such as assumptions, 
caveats, quality assurance and answering the right ques-
tions with constructive challenge become a cultural fix-
ture [51]. Subject Benchmark Statements can be updated 
in Higher Education so that it is clear that ethics [52], 
context and the modelling lifecycle must be covered. In 
addition, leadership and soft skills should be taught so 
that a cultural shift and continuous improvement mental-
ity occurs downstream within organisations.
• A suite of transparent crisis response models with guid-
ance on adaptions: In situations of urgency, it is advis-
able to have on hand a set of models that are validated 
and verified. This is advisable for high risk situations, 
or indeed business critical models, such as defence and 
health. These models can then be used by modellers to 
adapt to the current circumstances. In high risk situa-
tions it is crucial that an open and flowing communica-
tion channel is used.
The recommendations above form a pathway to more 
improved, robust modelling. It is crucial for the future of 
the UK that we develop ways to communicate and challenge 
so that the technical expertise can flourish, especially within 
policy. The situations discussed above affect the entire of 
UK and every inhabitant. Therefore, we owe it to them to 
implement the best solutions based on rigorous, ethical, 
evidence-based analysis.
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